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Made Sin For Us

Take a look at this verse, when Paul exhorts the believers at Corinth to be reconciled to God;

2Co 5:21 For he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. (KJV)

The nature of divinely authored human faith is much different from that of God's own state; We are not called to be omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent. We are called to obedience, and that obedience to God is not complete blind submission, but knowledge of a good standing before God.

It is remarkable then that "faith" being consistent in L(G) should take the same form as the "Mighty To Save" argument from this section.

Please do compare the liberty of God as a redemption of a transgression f, entailing for all 'l' the result ¬P(f(l)), and the perceived perfection p in a f(G) v G&p statement (referred to simply as G v p from now on.) with the apparent necessity for salvation. You may be surprised!

With regards to contingent redemption, keep times t2 > t1 firmly in mind as before.

If one assumes that a statement G v p has some aesthetic weight, that there must be a change in God's perceived quality toward a person, to answer a desire or some such to suit the individual, if this would inconsistently place God not at liberty in His person, then we infer an f(G) which is analogous to ¬L(G). say, at the time of inception of p (aesthetic conceiving) say, t1; Then as N(f(G)) => f(l), l is at fault in their conception of God and therefore must repent. (whether p is a positive statement or not.)

If we then redeem the situation by assuming that there necessarily exists some time t2 > t1, when l's faith in God is free to return to that of the liberty due God in His former state (if we realise that it is inconsistent to demand of him and state that he was not perfect to begin with before t1)

Then as a necessity that liberty as L(G) must not be contingent (on pleasing any but God Himself), I.e. we must require t2 = t1 to recover the application of L(G) over every interval, and instead of us requiring G v p, and inferring N(p) simply because p is positive for us, we infer by an existence of t2 which recovers L(G), that there is actually some virtue q, where (G&q) v p was necessarily and consistently perfect on the left hand side. L(G) is an adequate substitution for all such q. (it is inconsistent for God to be not at liberty ¬L(G) God's liberty is then a virtue we may not dismiss.)

Likewise we may incur g(G) v G&¬q for some virtue q that God necessarily exhibits. Clearly L(G) is such as for God to choose His virtues? It does nothing to private or refine any choice of such. - It is the "essence of faith".

Thus positing the analogue of "as necessary" salvation, i.e. ¬L(G&q) at t1 and L(G&q) at t2=> L(G) with t1=t2 (much as P(f(l)) at t1 & ¬P(f(l)) at t2=> N(¬P(f(l))) with t1=t2 for all 'l' from the mighty to save part of the section.) The liberty of God becomes necessary (rather than our faith as to L(G) or not) if we wish to remain a believer in good stead, much as our salvation would appear to be necessary if there is assumed some necessary fault withholding the redeemed from salvation.

The consequence is that either God's liberty (the righteousness of God: 2Cor Ch:5v21 above) is either not liberty , (c.f the perfection becomes inconsistent - as compared to God is inconsistent as previously on G&¬G) Or the lack of liberty must be withdrawn, (as also must have been the accusation f(l)=>G&¬G

So the associations...

f(l) <=> ¬L(G)

¬P(f(l)) <=> L(G)

God saves <=> (N(q) for all virtues q) and p is aesthetically pleasing

...are valid, if L(G) is retained (c.f. the salvation requires a t2) and then faith in G also as consequence, every possible p and q is implied by the existence of G, and not by the essence of faith, L(G), which is to contradict expected requirement for one or the other.

Therefore the analogy of 'f' as a transgression; with ¬L(G) as that which is the example of sin, (i.e. the desire to not do well under the one God's laws, here a law of faith), is matched to bring correct faith in God in exactly the same theorem. If there be no particular t2 for redemption, then we can assume for God, there most certainly is one where t2=t1. The person of Jesus Christ can be said to entail L(G) necessarily as would redemption for salvation then in completeness of knowledge of L(G) with all correct virtue 'q'.

The above statements all become consistent when L(G) and G & q, rather than (G & q) v (G & p). The analogy is to only ¬P(f(l)) and G being self consistent. I.e. if a believer holds true L(G) after t2 > t1 then there is always a fault corresponding to L(G)&¬L(G) that is as an f, and as 'f' it is likewise inconsistent for those whom hold L(G) and they may come into better knowledge of God's virtues..

Food for thought isn't it? Then we wish to justify that the example of complete faith in accordance with satisfying obedience to, (and without any fault under) the law is found in the person of Jesus Christ; blamelessly doing so in full understanding of all God's virtues in accordance with God's sovereign liberty L(G).


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