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Metamath
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 Nothing Less Than Zero When we consider the existence of God, Anselm put it that God exists in such a fashion that he can not be thought rationally to not exist. The most important part of this statement is the term 'exists' has a modified sense. Anselm stated 'Thou exist so truly...' Whilst most people would counter argue that 'existence is not a predicate' we are perhaps talking cross purposes, in that we are not discussing the regular type of existence of ordinary things, (hats, scarves, kittens, etc.) It is argued that existence is not a property of a thing that exists, but rather of that to which it belongs in set terms; a simple matter of number rather than property. we cant say for instance that the integer "five" exists, though we may state "there are five apples". Is it possible that we have to change language to conceive 'existence' as a predicate? Well, not really. When thinking of the existence of regular contingent things, such things like islands may (quite possibly) not 'require existence' as a property. However, a 'perfect being' requires existence of a kind in order to be a self consistent logical entity. We are in a sense requiring the special case of zero not being positive OR negative, but an exception. It is important that the existence of a perfect being does not prevent the possibility of any thing else existing, (though indeed His own potential for future creation may restrict the present state of things.) This is not to be confused with the example of zero as constant, though most would consider zero as not positive or negative a 'better system'. In like terms, the Mathematical structure of the argument requires us to consider not God's nature, his values, his will and testament, but only his existence itself. That God cannot be thought to exist as merely an idea or concept, but must transcend the ownership of the individual's concept and reside as external to ourselves as well as within is pivotal. That God sees himself merely as the sum of all that is as well (as all potential for that which may be) lacks potential itself, for God must see himself as greater and more truly existent than that which he knows himself to be. Now, on the point of language that God has infinite potential to "be", he could only ever be as static as his own knowledge of himself at any time we choose, unless he to have a (Theos) Son to reflect himself upon. And with the Son upon his Father likewise. We require, in some strange language to have two strictly different but mutual 'containers' in which each has full knowledge of its own existence and potential, with some degree of freedom found in considering the content of the other. That in some sense the mirror looks back upon the bearer with a gaze of its own and in a more "pleasing" fashion requires some 'existence' to what is more than a simple partition of odd and even rungs on the existential ladder. Why would one God not have two pair's of eyes? For in unity of the two (whilst requiring individuality), there is a further requirement upon the presence of a mere reflection. The reflection must live. In order to have perfect knowledge of that which lives, and be causal of that life, there is with one compound God mimicking the two or three, "no potential" - the third that entails of two such Gods no further requirement for a such a mirror is gain, so there need be a container for both in a third. (Since adding such a third is a positive property.) |
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